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Abstract. Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in Japan have enacted 
Information Disclosure Ordinances, which require the disclosure of official 
government information. This paper uses Japanese prefecture-level data for the period 
1998–2004 to examine how this enactment affected the rate of government construction 
expenditure. The Dynamic Panel model is used to control for unobserved 
prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias. The major finding is that disclosure of 
government information reduces the rate of government construction expenditure. This 
implies that information disclosure reduces losses from rent-seeking activity, which is 
consistent with public choice theory. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely acknowledged that rent-seeking activity decreases economic efficiency 
(Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974). Olson (1982) emphasized that special interest groups 
have a propensity to lobby for preferential policies, imposing disproportionate costs on 
the rest of society. This in turn hinders economic growth (Olson, 1982; Heckelman, 
2000; Coates et al., 2011). Rent-seeking activities taken by special interest groups lead 
bureaucrats and politicians to allocate resources to increase the groups‟ benefits. For 
instance, construction of local public infrastructure may be lobbied for strongly by 
contractors, resulting in oversupply because it yields the large profit for contractors. 
The absence of profit incentives induces government organizations to be less efficient 
(Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). In Japan, this tendency is more obvious and so “larger 
amounts are spent on public works than in other countries, controlling for size and 
population” (Doi and Ihori, 2009, p.181). After World War II, “the business organization 
… has played a dominant role in economic policy making in Japan” (Olson, 1982, p.76). 
Firms in the construction industry frequently received orders from local governments as 
a result of lobbying activity (Asano, 2010). As is widely known, sectors such as the 
construction industry have strong electoral leverage in Japan; resulting in local 
governments spending lavishly on public works projects to benefit the industry. 
Because of the information asymmetry between government and citizens, politicians, 
bureaucrats and special interest groups can seek benefits for themselves at the expense 
of public works needed to increase social welfare. If citizens can obtain sufficient 
information about the government‟s activities, they are then able to criticize the 
government for inefficient resource allocation to particular sectors. That is, the behavior 
of politicians and bureaucrats can be monitored by citizens. Accordingly, the likelihood 
that a politician is reelected is reduced if they cannot determine the causes of and 
possible solutions to citizen dissatisfaction. To use Hirschman‟s term, this is the voice 
effect (Hirschman, 1970). As a result, the government is forced to be efficient and to 
maximize social welfare to satisfy citizens. Kopits and Craig (1998) asserted that 
“transparency in government operation is widely regarded as an important precondition 
for macroeconomic fiscal sustainability, good governance, and overall fiscal rectitude.” 
The seminal work of Alt and Lassen (2006a) provided evidence from OECD countries 
that fiscal transparency, which seems to reduce information asymmetry, reduces public 
debt and deficit. Benito and Bastida (2009) used information from forty one OECD and 
less developed countries to show a positive relationship between budget transparency 
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and national government fiscal balance.1 Recently, local governments in Japan have 
enacted Information Disclosure Ordinances (IDOs), which require the disclosure of 
official information to ensure accountability (Jiyukokuminsha, 2009). These ordinances 
allow citizens to access information about government activities, reducing the 
information asymmetry between local governments and citizens. IDOs are considered to 
increase fiscal and budget transparency (Yamashita and Akai, 2005), and are therefore 
important from the point of view of both democracy and economic efficiency. However, 
the effectiveness of IDOs in Japan has only been sufficiently explored by Yamashita and 
Akai (2005). 
By using IDOs as a proxy for government transparency, the purpose of this paper is to 
examine empirically the effect of IDOs on the rate of government construction 
expenditure. However, there seems to be a reverse causality between the disclosure of 
information and government size (or the rate of government construction expenditure). 
This results in an endogeneity bias, which we aim to avoid in this paper by using the 
Arellano-Bond type Dynamic Panel model. The key finding is that IDOs decrease the 
rate of government construction expenditure, in line with our hypothesis. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Disclosure of official local 
government information is briefly reviewed in Section 2. Section 3 explains the data and 
methods used. Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers 
concluding observations. 
 
 
2. Review of disclosure of local government information in Japan 
 
2.1. The Information Disclosure Act  
The central government in Japan enacted an information disclosure law in 1999.2 
Information disclosure law is based on the right to know (Muroi, 1999). Prior to this 
enactment by the central government, local governments in Japan at the level of towns 
and villages played a leading role in disclosing public information. In 1982, the first 
information disclosure ordinance was enacted in Japan in the northeastern town of 
Kanayama (Muroi, 1999). Information disclosure ordinances specify regulations for a 
particular local government to provide residents the right to request the disclosure of 
                                                   
1  Previous work using cross-country data suggested that political accountability 
increases government size (Lassen, 2000). Along the same lines, Alt et al. (2001) argued 
that fiscal transparency results in a larger government, based on results from the 
United States. 
2 The Freedom of Information Act in the United States was enacted in 1967. 
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information possessed by the government. As shown in Figure 1, the rate of enactment 
of information disclosure ordinances rose drastically from 1998 to 2004. The rate of 
enactment was about 0.2 in 1998 and reached 0.9 in 20043,4. Disclosure of public 
information ordinances aim to ensure local government accountability in towns, villages 
and municipalities, and allow citizens to identify fraudulent interests on the part of 
politicians, bureaucrats, or private firms. There are various kinds of corrupt uses of 
public funds, such as cheating and collusion. Before the mid-1990s, information 
disclosure systems did not function well in the majority of Japan‟s local governments. 
Bureaucrats often claimed expenses for business trips which were not actually 
undertaken. This dishonest behavior was, however, not disclosed to citizens. In the 
early 1990s, a number of politicians also held the role of company manager for private 
firms, even though being prohibited by law from engaging in side businesses, and were 
in a position to receive orders for construction work from local governments (Asano, 
2010). 
Moreover, the cozy relationships among politicians, bureaucrats and industry, 
referred as an “iron triangle”, are often discussed (Sakakibara, 2003). In particular, 
public works have been considered the focus of such collusion as summarized by 
Feldhoff (2002). For example, collusion among bidders for public works, which is known 
as “dango” exists, and is sometimes arranged by public officials5. Public officials often 
restrict competition between bidders and protect the profits of local construction 
companies6. Construction companies gave retired bureaucrats lucrative positions in 
return (which is called “amakudari” in Japanese). This is an example of collusion 
between bureaucrats and construction companies. The relationship between local 
politicians, including governors, and the construction industry is similar. Politicians 
sometimes increase the proportion of expenditure allocated to public works in the hope 
that the construction industry would contribute to or support election campaigns. It was 
                                                   
3 A rate of 1 indicates that all local governments have enacted such ordinances. 
4 Since 2005, the annexation of municipalities, towns and villages has rapidly increased. 
As a result, the number of municipalities, towns and villages decreased to around 2,300 
in 2005, and to approximately 1,800 in 2009. Accordingly, the rate of municipalities 
enacting ordinances rose from 0.97 in 2005 to 0.99 in 2009. Annexation of municipalities 
is thought to be positively related to the rate of enacting ordinances. That is, the rate of 
enacting disclosure ordinances is partly affected by the annexation of municipalities. 
From 2005 to 2009, the change in the rate of enacting disclosure ordinances was minute. 
Therefore, we focus on the period of 1998–2004 in this paper. 
5 McMillan (1991) estimated that excess profits earned by the construction industry 
from collusion amounts to 16% to 33% of the bid price. 
6 As pointed out by Ohashi (2009), the discretionary procurement procedure, for 
example exclusive territories, provides a breeding ground for collusion and corruption 
even if public officials or politicians are not involved explicitly. 
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pointed out that the political power of the construction industry influenced the amount 
of local public expenditure on construction work (Kondoh, 2008; Yamashita, 2001). 
However, existing research has paid little attention to the link between government 
transparency and political influence on the rent-seeking industry. 
Subsidies tend to be provided to sectors with strong electoral leverage, and local 
governments spend lavishly on public works projects. Information disclosure revealed 
that public funds were being used illegally and that the total amount of such 
expenditure amounted to four billion yen in 1998 (Muroi, 1999, p.106). Once an IDO is 
in place, the process by which, for example, suppliers of public services are appointed 
becomes transparent, and inappropriate behavior by politician can be exposed. With 
IDOs, citizens can identify possible collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and 
rent-seeking firms, which reduces public expenditure on the construction industry. Thus, 
we regard expenditure on public works by local government as corresponding to the 
rent-seeking industry. 
Municipalities are the lowest level of local government. A cursory examination of 
Figure 1 reveals that the rate at which municipalities enacted IDOs rose rapidly from 
1998 to 2004. In 1998, the rate was about 0.22, but reached 0.92 by 2004. This indicates 
that this period saw a drastic change as government information became more 
accessible to citizens. This change is expected to deter politicians and bureaucrats from 
behaving for self-interest. 
 
2.2. Changes in government construction expenditure 
   Figure 2 demonstrates changes in government construction expenditure during the 
period 1998–2004, which we define as the ratio of expenditure on ordinary construction 
work to total expenditures by municipalities7. We see from Figure 2 that government 
construction expenditure declines constantly. Figure 5 shows the relationship between 
the rate of IDO enactment and the rate of government construction expenditure. Figure 
4 implies that the rate of IDO enactment is negatively correlated with government 
construction expenditure, but the causality between them is uncertain. Hence, in the 
following sections, we examine this causality in more detail using regression analysis. 
 
2.3. Testable hypotheses 
The supply of public goods is determined not in the realized market but through a 
                                                   
7 Expenditure on ordinary construction work includes expenses for constructing roads, 
schools, and public facilities, which is almost equivalent to expenditure for public works 
by local governments in Japan. 
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political process, and therefore differs from the optimum level of supply in economic 
terms. The classical work of Niskanen (1971) asserts that bureaucrats in the 
government sector have a strong incentive to expand the organization for the sake of 
their power and positions, which is why bureaucrats endeavor to maximize their budget. 
The lack of incentives for maximizing social welfare leads government organizations to 
become less efficient than a „benevolent dictator‟ (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977). 
Consequently, the government has an inclination to supply unnecessary public goods. 
However, the cost of supplying public goods is financed through taxation of ordinary 
citizens. Citizens are thus likely to be dissatisfied and to criticize government policy 
when the cost of public goods exceeds their benefit. Nevertheless, the government has 
abundant information about the extent to which budget allocation is efficient, while this 
information is often difficult for citizens to obtain. Because of this information 
asymmetry, “government can easily manipulate information to inflate the value of the 
public goods they want to supply” (Hayami, 2001, p.227). 
IDOs reduce the cost of collecting information about government activities, and the 
enactment of IDOs seems to have reduced the information asymmetry between 
government and citizens. As a result, fiscal transparency is realized, enabling citizens to 
see precisely how public spending is used and the extent to which it benefits them. Once 
citizens can access this information, they are then able to evaluate the benefit of budget 
allocation and criticize policies as being for the self-interest of politicians and 
bureaucrats. To borrow the term of Hirschman, this is the voice of citizens stemming 
from their dissatisfaction against government (Hirschman, 1970). The number of 
ordinary citizen‟s votes is much greater than the number of votes from special interest 
groups, and hence citizen dissatisfaction reduces the likelihood that politicians are 
reelected. That is why the voice of citizens has a greater influence on government than 
rent-seeking activities of special interest groups. As argued by Benito and Bastida 
(2009), “the more information the budget discloses, the less the politicians can use fiscal 
deficit to achieve opportunistic goals.” Consequently, budget allocations become more 
efficient, reducing government expenditure in the rent-seeking industry. These 
considerations lead us to advance the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Government information disclosure decreases government construction 
expenditure. 
 
3. Data and method 
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3.1. Data 
Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables used in this paper, along with the 
means, standard deviations, and maximum and minimum values for the data used. 
This paper uses panel data at the prefecture level8. The structure of the data consists of 
forty seven prefectures for the period 1998–2004. The dependent variable in our 
estimation, CONTRAT, is calculated as the ratio of expenditure on ordinary 
construction work to total expenditure. The data for both of these is aggregated to the 
prefectural level from the Survey on Municipal Accounts issued by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. GDP per capita comes from Asahi Shimbun (2008). Population and the 
rate of IDO enactment are derived from Index Publishing (2006). The population 
working in the construction sector is collected from Asahi Shimbun (2008). The data for 
1996, 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2003 were generated by interpolation based on the 
assumption of constantly changing rates because data is only available for 1995, 1997, 
2000, 2002, and 2005. We use the population working in the construction sector and the 
total population to calculate the proportion of the population working in the 
construction sector. The unemployment rate comes from the website of the Statistics 
Bureau of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications9. The Population 
Census (1990, 2000), as published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, provided data for the number of people graduating from university. 
The data between 1998 and 2000 were generated by interpolation based on the 
assumption of constantly changing rates between 1990 and 2000, and the data between 
2001 and 2004 were calculated by adding the annual number who graduated from 
university between 2001 and 2004, collected from the Basic Report for Schools 
(2001-2004) published by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology. The proportion of leftwing seats in local assembly comes from the dataset on 
prefectural assembly, which is open to the public on Yosuke Sunahara‟s website10. 
We see from Table 2 that the correlation coefficient between CONTRAT and DINF 
is -0.70, which is consistent with Figure 3. 
 
3.2. Methods 
To examine the hypotheses raised previously, this paper uses the Arellano-Bond type 
                                                   
8 A Japanese prefecture is roughly equivalent to a state in the United States or a 
province in Canada. 
9 Available from http://www.stat.go.jp/data/roudou/pref/index.htm (accessed November 
1, 2010, Japanese only). 
10  Available from http://www.geocities.jp/yosuke_sunahara/data/data.html (accessed 
November 18, 2010, Japanese only). 
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Dynamic Panel model (Arellano, 2003). The estimated function takes the following 
form: 
CONTRATit=1 CONTRAT i(t-1) + 2DINFit +3CONPOPit +4UNEMPit + 5Ln(GDP) it + 
6EDUit +7LEFTit + 8FMALit +kt +ui +εit,                                                       
 
where the dependent variable is CONTRATit in prefecture i and year t, and the s 
represent regression parameters. The lag in the dependent variable is included as an 
independent variable. The unobservable fixed effects in prefecture i are represented by 
ui. The variable kt represents the specific effects for year t, which is captured by dummy 
variables that control for macro-level shocks in Japan. Further, εit is the error term. 
The structure of the data covers 6 years for 47 prefectures. However, the Dynamic Panel 
model takes the first difference, and CONTRAT lagged two periods or more are used as 
instruments, so 47 observations for two years are discarded. To eliminate ui from the 
model, we take the first difference form (Arellano, 2003). 
The parameter 2 can be interpreted as the effect of DINF change on CONTRAT. 
From the hypothesis proposed earlier, we anticipate that 2 should be negative. Control 
variables are as follows: CONPOP, which represents the proportion of workers in the 
construction sector, is included to capture the rent-seeking activity taken by special 
interest groups in the construction industry. The larger CONTRAT is, the more active 
the rent-seeking activity is. Hence, we expect the sign of 3 to be positive. UNEMP and 
Ln(GDP), which represent unemployment rates and per capita GDP respectively, are 
incorporated to control for economic conditions. Governments seem to increase 
investment for public construction so as to decrease unemployment rate. The predicted 
sign of 4 is positive. Further, the purpose of EDU is to capture human capital effects. 
LEFT is included to control for effect of ideology in each prefecture. FMAL is added as 
an independent variable to capture demographic effects. 
Large public expenditure for a particular sector allows citizens to determine whether 
public expenditure is used efficiently. This leads citizens to call for information 
disclosure by the government. A large construction expenditure increases the demand 
for construction workers, and so unemployment rates seem to decrease and GDP to 
increase. Thus we consider DINF, CONPOP, UNEMP and Ln(GDP) to be endogenous 
variables. Hence, the terms DINF, CONPOP, UNEMP and Ln(GDP) are treated as 
endogenous variables in the Dynamic Panel model for the purpose of controlling for 
estimation bias11. We use endogenous variables with a lag of two periods or more as 
                                                   
11 As in previous studies (Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009; Swaleheen, 2011), the Dynamic 
Panel model is used to control for endogenous bias by treating several independent 
  
9 
additional instrumental variables (Arellano, 2003, p.168). 
 
4. Results 
 
Besides the Dynamic Panel model, we conduct alternative estimations using the 
Fixed Effects model. Table 3 presents the Fixed Effects estimation results, which we 
consider before proceeding to the Dynamic Panel estimation results. As we predicted, 
the sign of the coefficient for DINF is negative and statistically significant in all 
columns. Further, its absolute value is 0.01, meaning that a 1% increase in IDO 
enactment leads to a decrease in government construction expenditure by 0.01%. 
CONPOP and UNEMP are not statistically significant, which is not consistent with 
what we anticipated. The sign of EDU is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting that more educated citizens prefer lower expenditure in the construction 
industry. LEFT has a significantly positive sign, which we interpret as implying that 
left wing politicians would like to protect „blue-collar‟ workers by supporting policies 
favoring the construction industry. Another plausible interpretation is that expenditure 
in the construction industry is viewed as a means for income redistribution, and is 
therefore encouraged by left wing politician. 
Table 4 presents the results of the Dynamic Panel estimation where, as explained in 
the previous section, DINF, CONPOP, UNEMP and Ln(GDP) are treated as endogenous 
variables. Before discussing the results in Table 4, we check the validity of the Dynamic 
Panel estimation. The two important tests are Sargan‟s over-identification test and the 
second-order serial correlation test (Arellano, 2003). We use Sargan‟s test to check the 
validity of the instrumental variables. The null hypothesis is that the instrumental 
variables are uncorrelated to the residual. If the hypothesis is not rejected, the 
instruments are considered valid. Furthermore, confirming the null hypothesis that 
there is no second-order serial correlation for the disturbance of the first-difference 
equation is important, because the consistency of the estimator relies upon the absence 
of second-order serial correlation. Table 4 tells us that both hypotheses are not rejected 
for all estimations, suggesting that the estimation results are valid. 
The coefficient of DINF is negative as anticipated, and is statistically significant at 
the 1% level in all columns. The absolute values of DINF are between 0.02 and 0.03, 
which is approximately 0.01-0.02 larger than those in Table 3. This implies that a 1% 
increase in IDO enactment decreases government construction expenditure by 
0.02-0.03%. Controlling for endogenous variable bias increases the effect of DINF. 
                                                                                                                                                     
variables as endogenous. 
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Contrary to the results in Table 3, the coefficients of CONPOP and UNEMP are positive 
and are statistically significant in all estimations. It is surprising that the values of 
CONPOP range from 2.23 to 3.59, implying that a 1% increase in the proportion of 
construction workers results in a 2.23-3.59% increase in government construction 
expenditure. Rent-seeking behavior in the construction industry is thus considered to 
contribute to an increase in government expenditure in the construction industry. The 
absolute values of UNEMP range from 0.87-1.03, suggesting that a 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate leads to a 0.87-1.03% increase in government expenditure for public 
works. EDU is significantly negative in column (1), whereas it is positive, although 
insignificant, in columns (2) and (3). Hence, the effect of EDU is not stable, showing that 
the results for EDU in Table 3 are not robust. LEFT has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in all columns, which is consistent with the 
results in Table 3. 
To check robustness, we conduct alternative estimations as presented in Tables 5 
(a)-(c). In Table 5 (a), only DINF is treated as an endogenous variable, while in Table 5 
(b), DINF and CONPOP are treated as endogenous variables, and in Table 5 (c), DINF, 
CONPOP, and UNEMP are treated as endogenous variables. To save space, only the 
results for DINF are shown in each table although the independent variables are the 
same as in Tables 3 and 4. As in Tables 3 and 4, DINF is negative and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level in most columns. In seven of the nine cases, the absolute 
values of coefficients range from 0.02-0.03, which is similar to the results shown in 
Table 4. 
Considering Tables 3-5 jointly strongly supports the hypothesis that information 
disclosure by the government decreases government construction expenditure. 
5. Conclusion 
 
Asymmetric information is a cause of both market and government failures, resulting 
in decreased social welfare. From an economic viewpoint, politicians and bureaucrats 
are seen as agents, whereas citizens are considered to be principals. Information 
asymmetry between agent and principal enables the agent to use opportunistic behavior 
and act inappropriately, causing a principal-agent problem in the political process. 
Rent-seeking activity in a particular industry leads politicians and bureaucrats to act in 
a way that benefits the industry at the expense of the greater society. Such activity 
cannot be criticized by citizens because the cost of accessing information is large. As a 
consequence, information asymmetry increases the likelihood that moral hazards occur. 
However, if government information is open to citizens, inappropriate activity by the 
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government can then be criticized, decreasing the likelihood that a politician is 
reelected. Therefore it is important for policy makers to reduce information asymmetry. 
IDOs are thus expected to play a critical role in improving government efficiency and 
were therefore increasingly enacted in Japan throughout the 1990s. 
This paper has attempted to ascertain the association between IDO enactment and 
government construction expenditure. Since the end of the 1990s, local governments in 
Japan have enacted IDOs. This paper used Japanese prefecture-level data for the 
period 1998–2004 to examine how the enactment of IDOs affects government 
construction expenditure. A Dynamic Panel model was used to control for unobserved 
prefecture-specific effects and endogenous bias of IDOs. The major findings are as 
follows. Rent-seeking behavior in the construction industry has a large positive effect on 
government expenditure on construction. Further, IDOs decrease the rate of 
government construction expenditure. This implies that IDOs improve the efficiency of 
government resource allocation, although the effect of rent-seeking behavior is still 
observed. We postulate that IDOs reduce the return from the rent-seeking activity 
thereby reducing the incentives for special interest groups to seek rent; as a 
consequence, rent-seeking activity seems to decline in the long run, increasing overall 
societal welfare. 
IDOs appear to have a critical role not only in the distribution of government 
expenditure but also in total government expenditure and deficit (Lassen, 2000; Alt et 
al., 2001; Alt and Lassen, 2006a). As few studies have investigated the factors 
determining government transparency (Alt and Lassen, 2006b), these issues should be 
investigated in future research. 
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Fig.1. Rate of municipalities enacting Information Disclosure Ordinances (%). 
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Fig.2. Rate of government construction expenditure (Expenditure on ordinary 
construction work/Total expenditure) 
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Fig.3. Correlation between the rate of enactment of Information Disclosure Ordinances 
and the rate of government construction expenditure. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and basic statistics. 
Variables Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
CONRAT Rate of government construction expenditure  
(expenditure on construction work/total expenditure) 
0.21 0.04 0.33 0.09 
DINF 
 
Rate of enactment of Information Disclosure Ordinances (IDOs) 
by municipalities 
(# of municipalities enacting IDOs/total # of municipalities) 
0.63 0.32 1 0 
CONPOP Proportion of population working in the construction sector 
 
0.15*10-3 0.55*10-3 5.1*10-3 0.005*10-3 
UENMP Unemployment rate 
 
0.04 0.01 0.08 0.02 
GDP 
 
Per capita GDP (Millions yen) 3.57 0.70 7.41 2.52 
EDU Rate of university graduation 
 
0.09 0.03 0.24 0.05 
LEFT Leftwing seats in local assembly 
 
0.09 0.05 0.26 0 
FMAL 
 
Female population rate 0.51 0.01 0.54 0.48 
 
Note. Values are simple averages. Data sources are Asahi Shimbun (2008), Index Publishing (2006) and the Statistics Bureau of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications (various years).  
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Table 2. Correlation matrix of variables used for estimation 
 CONRAT  DINF  CONPOP UNEMP GDP EDU  LEFT  FMAL 
CONRAT 1.00        
DINF -0.70 1.00       
CONPOP -0.01 0.05 1.00      
UNEMP -0.27 0.22 -0.001 1.00     
GDP -0.36 0.20 -0.06 -0.15 1.00    
EDU -0.48 0.28 -0.16 0.22 0.53 1.00   
LEFT 0.12 -0.11 0.003 0.17 0.03 0.09 1.00  
FMAL 0.25 -0.19 0.10 -0.07 -0.39 -0.45 0.19 1.00 
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Table 3. Dependent variable is CONRATt,: (Fixed Effects Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CONRATt-1 0.69*** 
(11.8) 
0.65*** 
(11.0) 
0.63*** 
(10.4) 
DINFt -0.01** 
(-1.98) 
-0.01*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.01** 
(-2.55) 
CONPOP -0.94 
(-0.62) 
-0.30 
(-0.20) 
-0.38 
(-0.25) 
UNEMP 0.13 
(0.51) 
0.12 
(0.50) 
0.11 
(0.43) 
Ln(GDP)t 
 
0.11*** 
(2.85) 
0.10*** 
(2.76) 
0.10*** 
(2.69) 
EDUt -0.71*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.43* 
(-1.71) 
-0.50* 
(-1.94) 
LEFTt  0.16*** 
(2.97) 
0.17*** 
(3.03) 
FMALt 
 
  0.33 
(1.31) 
R-square 
(between) 
0.56 0.52 0.51 
Observations 281 281 281 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1%levels, respectively.  
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Table 4. Dependent variable is CONRATt,: (Dynamic Panel Model) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
CONRATt-1 0.79*** 
(21.3) 
0.70*** 
(20.7) 
0.66*** 
(16.4) 
DINFt -0.02*** 
(-4.28) 
-0.03*** 
(-7.79) 
-0.03*** 
(-8.66) 
CONPOP 2.23** 
(2.42) 
3.59*** 
(4.28) 
3.36*** 
(3.68) 
UNEMP 0.87*** 
(3.15) 
1.08*** 
(4.82) 
1.03*** 
(4.59) 
Ln(GDP)t 
 
0.24*** 
(13.2) 
0.26*** 
(11.1) 
0.23*** 
(9.20) 
EDUt -0.17** 
(-2.32) 
0.20 
(1.38) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
LEFTt  0.20*** 
(7.53) 
0.19*** 
(6.61) 
FMALt 
 
  0.35*** 
(3.38) 
Endogenous 
variables 
DINF 
CONPOP 
UNEMP 
Ln(GDP) 
DINF 
CONPOP 
UNEMP 
Ln(GDP) 
DINF 
CONPOP 
UNEMP 
Ln(GDP) 
Sargan-test 
 <P-value> 
43.2 
<0.99> 
43.6 
<0.99> 
43.4 
<0.99> 
Serial correlation 
 Second order 
<P-value> 
0.42 
<0.66> 
-0.45 
<0.64> 
-0.33 
<0.74> 
Wald chi-square 83817 99325 8879 
Observations 233 233 233 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Dependent variable is CONRATt: (Dynamic Panel Model) 
(a) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DINFt -0.01** 
(-2.50) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.77) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.28) 
Independent 
variables 
The same as 
those in 
column (1) 
of Table 4 
The same as 
those in 
column (2) 
of Table 4 
The same as 
those in 
column (3) of 
Table 4 
Endogenous 
variables 
DINF DINF DINF 
Sargan-test 
 <P-value> 
39.7 
<0.06> 
39.2 
<0.07> 
39.6 
<0.07> 
Serial correlation 
 Second order 
<P-value> 
0.70 
<0.48> 
0.48 
<0.96> 
0.22 
<0.82> 
Wald chi-square 2952 2952 2708 
Observations 233 233 233 
 
(b) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DINFt -0.01*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.02*** 
(-6.67) 
-0.02*** 
(-5.88) 
Independent 
variables 
The same as 
those in 
column (1) 
of Table 4 
The same as 
those in 
column (2) 
of Table 4 
The same as 
those in 
column (3) of 
Table 4 
Endogenous 
variables 
DINF 
CONPOP 
DINF 
CONPOP 
DINF 
CONPOP 
Sargan-test 
 <P-value> 
43.6 
<0.40> 
44.2 
<0.37> 
43.8 
<0.39> 
Serial correlation 
 Second order 
<P-value> 
0.69 
<0.48> 
0.08 
<0.93> 
0.08 
<0.92> 
Wald chi-square 8229 7337 52807 
Observations 233 233 233 
 
 
(c) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
DINFt -0.02*** 
(-6.05) 
-0.03*** 
(-8.82) 
-0.03*** 
(-9.39) 
Independent 
variables 
The same as 
those in 
column (1) 
of Table 4 
The same as 
those in 
column (2) 
of Table 4 
The same as 
those in 
column (3) of 
Table 4 
Endogenous 
variables 
DINF 
CONPOP 
UNEMP 
DINF 
CONPOP 
UNEMP 
DINF 
CONPOP 
UNEMP 
Sargan-test 
 <P-value> 
43.9 
<0.87> 
42.9 
<0.90> 
41.0 
<0.93> 
Serial correlation 
 Second order 
<P-value> 
0.50 
<0.61 
-0.11 
<0.91> 
-0.08 
<0.92> 
Wald chi-square 61559 18277 2708 
Observations 233 233 233 
 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
